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ABSTRACT
This thesis identifies the case principles and
trends involving A-76 Process issues brought before the
General Accounting Office. It reviews the background,
history, issues and current methods of applying the A-76
Process in the Department of Defense. It then categorizes
and analyzes the A-76 protest decisions handed down from
the Comptroller General from January 1, 1997 to December
31, 2001. Following the review and analysis, the
interpretations of the statutory requirements by the
Comptroller General are examined to determine if the
current design of the A-76 process is being applied as it
was originally designed. It also examines protest decision
trends to determine what changes are needed to mitigate the
risk of future A-76 protests
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As early as 1955, the Executive Branch of the U.S.
Government encouraged Federal agencies to obtain
commercially available goods and services from the private
sector whenever the agency determined that such action was
cost effective. [Ref. 25] An Eisenhower Administration
executive directive is the foundation the A-76 process is
built on. Although the A-76 process’ origins date back to
1955, for over three decades (1955 through the Mid-1980’s)
very little emphasis was ever placed on the Executive
Branch’s 1955 recommendation. With the fear of a potential
Third World War firmly looming in both the minds of many
Americans and the Government officials who were elected to
protect them, controlling the growth of Government, and
more specifically the growth of the Department of Defense
(DoD), was not viewed as a major issue.
The build up of the U.S. military and the pinnacle of
U.S. Defense spending came to an abrupt halt shortly after
the Berlin Wall fell in November of 1989. [Ref. 2] For
little over a decade (1985-1997), DoD reduced procurement
spending by approximately 69%, personnel by 32%, and the
overall defense budget by 35%. [Ref. 23] Between 1989 and
1997, while DoD had reduced active duty personnel by 32%,
it had only reduced the number of personnel performing
infrastructure functions by 28%. [Ref. 5] A necessary
economic need for efficiency continued to press DoD to look
for new ways to reduce Defense spending. As a result,
numerous measures were taken over this period in an attempt
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to reduce the amount of Defense Dollars being spent every
year.
One such attempt to become more cost-efficient was to
reduce the DoD infrastructure through the implementation of
the Base Closure and Realignment and Commission (BRAC).
Even with BRAC resulting in the closure of a number of
bases throughout the United States, the DoD infrastructure
costs continued to absorb a significant portion of the DoD
budget. The idea of “doing more with less” began to emerge
as more than just a popular cliché to be touted throughout
the Pentagon and Congress, it emerged as a fact to be taken
into account when business decisions were being made
throughout the DoD. “The U.S. Navy is operating in an
environment of reduced budgets while being required to
maintain high levels of readiness to meet operational
requirements.” [Ref. 20] The oversized infrastructure
costs and reduction in procurement spending ultimately
pushed DoD officials into an even deeper corner where they
were forced to look even harder for more options to become
more cost efficient.
One avenue chosen by the DoD was to complete a
comprehensive review of the United States’ defense posture,
policy and programs. This comprehensive review became
known as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This QDR
resulted in a number of different defense initiatives,
including the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI) Report signed
by the Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, in November of
1997. This report set out a plan to transform the DoD for
the 21st century. The DRI goals were to revolutionize
business affairs within the DoD by incorporating better
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business practices from the private sector. The revolution
in business affairs included taking a closer look at how
efficiently the Government was performing many of its basic
internal functions. The DRI called for the subjecting of
more than 120,000 civil-service personnel positions to the
A-76 process from 1998-2002. To put this number in
perspective, the number is three times larger than the
number of positions that were reviewed over the past two
decades.
With the fear of the Cold War over and the reality of
doing more with less becoming common practice throughout
the DoD, the A-76 process became the tool of choice for new
ways to become more efficient. Similar to many processes
used within the Government and the private sector, very few
are considered fundamentally perfect. The A-76 process
requires a minimum of two competing sides. When one side
loses, questions inevitably arise. If the answers are
insufficient, protests are often made. The Comptroller
General at the General Accounting Office (GAO) addresses
these protests.
B. PURPOSE
This thesis identifies the case principles and trends
involving the A-76 process issues brought before the GAO.
It reviews the background, history, issues and current
methods of applying the A-76 process in the DoD. It then
categorizes and analyzes the A-76 protest decisions handed
down from the Comptroller General from January 1, 1997 to
December 31, 2001. Following the review and analysis, it
also examines protest decision trends to determine what
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changes are needed to mitigate the risk of A-76 protests
from occurring in the future.
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The primary objective of this research is to determine
if the protests made about the A-76 process are uncovering
any major deficiencies. If so, the goal is to identify
the deficiencies and make recommendations on how the DoD
can properly address them. The ultimate result is to
improve the overall process.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
What are the key case principles and trends involving
the A-76 Process brought before the General Accounting
Office, and how might this information be used to improve
the Department of Defense’s Acquisition Process?
2. Secondary Questions
In answering the primary question, the following
secondary questions will be addressed:
a. What is the history and background of the A-76
process?
b. How has the A-76 process been applied
throughout the DoD?
c. What problems, if any, have resulted from
DoD’s application of the A-76 process?
d. What benefits, if any, has DoD realized
because of the A-76 process?
E. SCOPE
The scope of this thesis provides an objective
assessment to DoD, as to whether the A-76 outsourcing
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process is effectively working as it was originally
designed. The scope of the study includes:
1. A review of the history and regulations regarding the
evolution of the A-76 process;
2. An examination of the different steps of the A-76
process;
3. Presentation of issues and concerns associated with
the A-76 process;
4. An in-depth analysis of the decisions made by the GAO
with regard to protests involving A-76;
5. An analysis of changes that are needed to mitigate the
risk of A-76 related protests; and
6. An analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the A-
76 process.
The thesis concludes with relevant suggestions and
recommendations to improve the design and application of
the A-76 process.
F. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this thesis research consists
of the following steps.
1. Conduct a comprehensive literature search of books,
magazine articles, CD ROM Systems, Department of
Defense (DoD) directives, Government reports,
Internet-based materials and other library information
resources.
2. Conduct a search of the GAO database for protest cases
that involved A-76 as an element of the protest filed
since January 1, 1997 through December 31, 2001.
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3. Identify trends or key elements that will allow the
cases to be categorized and analyzed.
G. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
This thesis is limited to protests that involve the A-
76 process as an element of the protest that have occurred
from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2001. The primary
assumption in this study is that the reader is familiar
with the basic Federal acquisition contracting process.
H. DEFINITIONS
As previously stated in the assumptions, the reader(s)
of this thesis should have a basic knowledge of the Federal
acquisition contracting process, however, there are a
number of different key terms that are frequently used
synonymously throughout the Acquisition workforce that need
to be clearly defined. In order to alleviate any possible
misinterpretation and to establish a common reference point
for how these key terms are used throughout this thesis,
general working definitions are presented below.
1. A-76 Process
The Term “A-76 process”, as it is used throughout this
thesis, refers directly to the application of the entire
mechanistic process outlined in the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 and its subsequent updates.
The A-76 process includes a series of steps, which are
outlined in the next chapter. The “A-76 process” and “cost




The term “outsourcing” is often synonymously used in
place of the term “A-76 process”. It is important to
understand that outsourcing is not the A-76 process but one
possible outcome of it. The working definition of
“outsourcing” used throughout this thesis is, “The transfer
of a function previously performed in house to an outside
provider.” [Ref. 2] The essence of the definition is a
contractual agreement between the customer and one or more
suppliers to provide services or processes that the
customer is currently providing internally.
3. Competitive Sourcing
“Competitive sourcing” is the process whereby the cost
of Government performance of a commercial activity is
formally compared to the cost of performance of commercial
sources. In contrast, outsourcing is the contracting of
the commercial activity.
4. Privatization
“Privatization” and “outsourcing” are two uniquely
different terms. Privatization is, “a process of changing
a public entity or enterprise to private control and
ownership”. Outsourcing specifically relates to the
transfer of a function but not the full responsibility of
the recurring services or functions. The A-76 process in




“Commercial activity” is an activity whose core
functions include a process resulting in a product or
service that is, or could be, obtained from a private
sector source. Government agencies’ missions may be
accomplished through commercial facilities and resources,
through Government facilities and resources, or through a
mix of both of these, depending upon the products and
services needed and the agency missions involved. [Ref.
26] Only activities defined as commercial activities are
candidates for outsourcing.
6. Strategic Sourcing
“Strategic sourcing” is another term often
misinterpreted as the A-76 process, privatization or
outsourcing. For the purpose of this thesis “strategic
sourcing” will be defined as, “the approach used to reduce
the total cost of providing infrastructure by conducting a
comprehensive review of a business unit or units
considering a wide range of options including
consolidation, restructuring, privatization, make or buy
decisions, adopting better management practices,
development of joint venture with the private sector, asset
sale, and the termination of obsolete services or
programs”. [Ref. 2]
7. Interested Party
An “interested party” for the purposes of filing a
protest means an actual or prospective offeror whose direct
economic interest would be affected by the award of a
contract or by the failure to award a contract. [Ref. 6]
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8. Protest
A “protest” means a written objection by an interested
party to any of the following: (1) a solicitation or other
request by an agency for offers for a contract for the
procurement of property or services, (2) the cancellation
of the solicitation or other request, (3) an award or
proposed award of the contract, and (4) a termination or
cancellation of an award of the contract, if the written
objection contains an allegation that the termination or
cancellation is based in whole or in part on improprieties
concerning the award of the contract. [Ref. 6]
I. ORGANIZATION OF THIS THESIS
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II
provides a brief background on the evolution of OMB A-76
and the A-76 process. It discusses the design and
procedures used when completing an A-76 study; it reviews
the intended gains the process is designed to achieve; and
finally, it provides a review of A-76 issues that often
unintentionally surface at a command when conducting an A-
76 study.
Chapter III provides a brief description of the
protest process and addresses protests made to the GAO
where A-76 was an element of the protest. The protests are
broken down into sustained and denied categories and case
principles are identified.
Chapter IV documents the GAO’s protest decisions, and
interpretations of the statutory requirements are analyzed
in terms of current procurement policies to determine if
acquisition professionals are applying the A-76 process
9
correctly. This chapter also examines circumstances likely
to draw a protest.
Chapter V provides conclusions, recommendations,
answers to the research questions and includes suggested
areas for further research.
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II. OMB CIRCULAR A-76
A. PURPOSE OF OMB CIRCULAR A-76
The primary purpose of OMB Circular A-76 is to set
forth the procedures for determining whether commercial
activities should be performed under contract with
commercial sources or in-house using Government facilities
and personnel. [Ref. 17]
The A-76 process is one part of an entire suite of
efficiency-oriented defense reform initiatives that DoD has
implemented. This initiative is designed to generate
savings that can be used for modernization, improving
readiness, improving war fighter support and improving
quality of life. The A-76 process has evolved into a
thorough analytical effort aimed at maximizing the
efficient use of scarce Government resources.
B. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF OMB A-76
As the first chapter stated, the origins of the A-76
process date back to the Eisenhower Administration in 1955
with Budget Bulletin 55-4, which stated: “It is the general
policy of the Federal Government that it will not start or
carry on any commercial activity to provide a service or
product for its own use if such product or service can be
procured from private enterprise through ordinary business
channels.” [Ref. 4] However, it was not until March of
1966 when the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
released OMB Circular A-76, “Performance of Commercial
Activities”, that this policy was officially formalized.
The original A-76 circular’s basic principle was
clear-cut, the Government was to rely on the private sector
11
for the products and services the Government needed. The
circular stated that a Government commercial activity could
provide goods or services only under one of the following
circumstances:
a. Procurement of a product or service from a
commercial source would disrupt or materially delay
an agency’s program.
b. It is necessary for the Government to conduct a
commercial or industrial activity for purposes of
combat support or for individual and unit retaining
of military personnel or to maintain or strengthen
mobilization readiness.
c. A satisfactory commercial source is not available
and cannot be developed in time to provide a product
or service when it is needed.
d. The product or service is available from another
Federal agency.
e. Procurement of the product or service from a
commercial source will result in a higher cost to
the Government.
The objective of the circular was to leave very little
room for interpretation. The policy guidance was to
require the Government to use the private sector when
obtaining goods or services and only if exceptional
circumstances come about, provide the services from within.
[Ref. 1]
The original A-76 circular went through several
revisions and added a supplement to respond to critic’s
comments, to grow with a continually changing U.S.
12
political system and in general simplify the complex
process. The first revision occurred in 1967. This
revision focused on providing formal guidance for cost
comparison procedure determinations. This was the only
substantive change made in the 1967 revision.
The circular remained untouched until March of 1979,
when a new version was released. The 1979 revision defined
specific steps to be taken when determining whether an
agency must contract out. This revision was the first to
take steps to spell out a specific process when conducting
A-76 studies.
In 1983, after a two-year analysis of the A-76
circular by the OMB staff, a major revision was released.
This revision was designed to clarify procedures,
streamline methodology and enhance equity in the process.
This revision included the circular’s first supplemental
handbook, which outlined specific guidelines, when applying
the A-76 process. Three fundamental principles that are
endorsed as the three primary goals of the policy today
were readdressed in this revision:
1) Achieve economy and enhance productivity (through
increased competition),
2) Keep Government functions “in-house” (leave
inherently Governmental functions untouched),
3) And rely on the commercial sector for products and
services, but only if more economical. [Ref. 7]
This Supplemental Handbook set forth specific
procedures for determining whether commercial activities
13
should be performed in-house using Government facilities
and personnel.
The supplemental handbook saw its first revision in
March of 1996. This revision to the supplemental handbook
provided updated guidance and procedures for determining
whether recurring commercial activities should be operated
under contract with commercial sources, in-house using
Government facilities and personnel, or through
interservice support agreements. The supplement emphasized
the point that Circular A-76 was not designed to simply
contract out. Rather, it is designed to:
1) Balance the interests of the parties to a make or
buy cost comparison,
2) Provide a level playing field between public and
private offerors to a competition, and
3) Encourage competition and choice in the management
and performance of commercial activities. [Ref. 18.]
This revision of the supplemental handbook introduced,
for the first time, the requirement to compete for new or
expanded reimbursable work based on an A-76 cost
comparison.
Although the original A-76 Circular and all of its
subsequent revisions provided written policy and guidance
on how to conduct an A-76 study, there had always been one
major question left unanswered. The circular failed to
specifically address the area of when and what should be
contracted out. The original circular provided definitions
for what an inherently Governmental function was, but did
not spell out the process or requirement for identifying
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the activities that were not inherently Governmental. In
1999, the Circular went through another revision that
established Federal policy regarding the performance of
commercial activities and implementation of the statutory
requirements of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act
(FAIR) of 1998, Public Law 105-270. The implementation of
the FAIR Act in the A-76 process made it a requirement for
agencies to list those activities that are not inherently
Governmental with OMB. In essence, this revision added
missing teeth to the A-76 Process.
OMB Circular A-76 has matured immensely over the past
35 years. With continued solid support from the Government
officials who write the circular’s language, it will
continue to evolve into a process that can be used
effectively by procurement officials to ensure that the
Federal Government is not competing with the private sector
for goods or services than can be obtained through the
commercial market.
C. HOW THE A-76 PROCESS WORKS
The A-76 Process is a comprehensive 12 step process
(see Figure 2.1) that should take no longer than 24 to 48
months depending on the type of A-76 study being conducted.
A provision in the National Defense Authorization Act
delineated the 24-month requirement for a single-function
cost comparison and 48-month requirement for a
multifunction cost comparison. The public announcement in
Step 2 starts the timeline and the tentative cost
comparison decision in Step 9 ends the process.
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Step 1-Identification and Packaging of Commercial Activity
Step 2-Formation of A-76 Study Team and Public Announcement of Study
Step 3-Begin Acquisition Actions (Primarily create PWS and QASP)
Step 4-Preparation and Issuance of Solicitation
Step 5-Creation of Government Management Plan (MEO, IHCE, TPP, TP)
Step 6-Independent Review
Step 7-Neogtiation Phase
Step 8-Selection of Single Contractor that will compete with MEO
Step 9-Tenative Decision between MEO and Contractor Bid
Step 10-Adminstrative Appeals Process
Step 11-Implement MEO
Step 12-Post A-76 Actions
A-76 Twelve Step Process
Figure 2.1 A-76 Step-By-Step Process
The first step in the A-76 process is the
identification and packaging of the commercial activities
intended to be studied. The implementation of the FAIR Act
into OMB Circular A-76 has assisted activities in this step
by requiring them to identify and report a list of all
their commercial activities to OMB on an annual basis.
Once the commercial activities are identified, they are
organized into business units that would be most suitable
for competition. “The effective packaging is the critical
first step that ensures competition will be maximized
during the cost comparison process.” [Ref. 26] This step
is completed prior to the releasing of the public
announcement that starts the timeline for the study.
Once the packaging step is completed the commercial
activity plan for the A-76 Study is created. Multiple
actions occur simultaneously during this step, the A-76
Study Team is formed, which in turn develops the action
plan for the study. Almost immediately upon the completion
of the plan, the public announcement of the A-76 study is
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officially made. Congress is the first group notified in
the process, followed by an announcement to the local work
force and the local community. The Installation Commander
is responsible for making the formal notification to the
workers who will be directly affected. The leader of the
A-76 Study Team should be present to assist the
Installation Commander in answering questions.
The Unit Commander and A-76 Study Team will be
required throughout the cost comparison study to elicit
participation from the workers. It is imperative at this
point that the entire process be explained to the workers.
By explaining the process, they will be able to garner more
assistance and help reduce some of the anxiety and fear the
employees may be feeling. A major key to the success of
any A-76 study is constant communication between the A-76
study team and the employees being affected.
After the study has been officially announced to the
public, step three begins with the first acquisition
actions being initiated. In this step, the Contracting
Officer begins to play a critical role in the A-76 process.
He is responsible for integrating the FAR requirements with
the OMB and DOD rules. He assists in the development of
the Performance Work Statement (PWS), the Quality Assurance
Surveillance Plan (QASP), the preparation and issuance of
the solicitation and conducting negotiations prior to the
cost comparison. He is specifically responsible for
preparing and/or issuing a Commerce Business Daily (CBD)
notice, market survey, and Independent Government Estimate,
as well as facilitating the source selection process and
ultimately monitoring the performance of the selected
17
service provider after the implementation. The crucial two
pieces of this step include the development of the PWS and
the QASP.
The PWS, also referred to as the statement of work
(SOW) or requirements document, is the document that
describes the work to be performed including the
definitions of results or outcomes derived from the
commercial activity. The PWS is the description of what
the Government intends to buy, regardless of the outcome of
the cost comparison. It ultimately becomes Section C,
which is the technical performance section of the Request
for Proposal (RFP) that is issued by the Contracting
Officer. The development of the PWS is one of the most
difficult, time consuming and critical pieces in the A-76
process. The Contractor and the Government’s in-house
organization develop their respective offers to perform the
work requirements based on the PWS. If the right amount of
time and effort is not given by the right qualified
personnel during the creation of the PWS, the entire A-76
study can ultimately fail.
The QASP is best defined as the mechanism used to
implement the inspection and acceptance clauses outlined in
the FAR. It describes methods of inspection, required
reports, and resources to be used including estimated work
hours; it purposely focuses on the quality of the products
and or services received rather than the procedures used to
provide them. The creation of the QASP describes the
procedures the Government will use to ensure that the
actual performance of a successful contractor’s proposal
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meets the requirements of the PWS, if the commercial
activity is outsourced as a resort of the A-76 study.
The QASP also provides the procedures for the Post-
Most Efficient Organization Performance Review, which is an
evaluation of the in-house organization’s performance if
the A-76 study results in keeping the commercial activity
in-house. When writing the QASP, the cost comparison team
has to be careful not write too many metrics into the plan.
Too many metrics and overly intrusive oversight can result
in costly monitoring expenses and upsets contractors or
Government employees. Upon completion of the PWS and QASP,
the two documents go through an official review and
approval process.
The fourth step in the process is the preparation and
issuance of the solicitation document. This includes
determining the appropriate contract type, creating the
source selection plan, developing evaluation criteria,
developing the Independent Cost Estimate and then preparing
and releasing the solicitation. During this step, the
Government identifies methods of conducting interaction
with private industry and potential offerors prior to
issuance of the solicitation.
There are various unique requirements that need to be
included in the solicitation package. The contractor must
be notified that the final award is based solely on a cost
comparison between the apparent successful commercial
bidder and the Government’s in-house cost estimate. If the
Government’s in-house estimate is found to be more
economical, the commercial activity will not be outsourced
to the contractor. The solicitation document must include
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the Right of First Refusal of Employment clause, which
ensures that Federal employees whose positions are
eliminated if an activity is outsourced will be given
priority for employment with the winning contractor. The
Contracting Officer and the A-76 Study Team work together
throughout this step in order to ensure eventual success of
the A-76 Study.
Step number five is considered the other most critical
step in the A-76 process. In this step, the Government
creates a management plan, which is made up of four key
documents, the Most Efficient Organization (MEO), the In-
house Cost Estimate (IHCE), the Technical Performance Plan
(TPP) and the Transition Plan (TP). The Management Plan is
the in-house organization's proposal for how it will
perform the commercial activity. It describes how the
current organization will be structured or restructured,
staffed and the operating procedures to be followed in
performing the requirements of the PWS. This is the step
in the A-76 process where any new and potentially long-term
efficiencies in the way business is currently being done
can be achieved.
The MEO is the document that is intended to reflect
the Government’s MEO that meets the requirements outlined
in the PWS. The MEO should identify the organizational
structures, staffing and operating procedures upon which
the Government’s offer is based. The development of the
MEO requires input from all levels of the organization
including analysts, functional managers and supervisors.
This is why constant communication between the A-76 Study
Team and the employees is so important throughout the
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process. The Activities’ Human Resources Office can be
used as a key resource when developing the MEO.
The IHCE is the part of the Government’s management
plan that is supposed to provide a description of all costs
associated with the performance of the MEO and any assets
that are not provided to the contract but that will be used
by the MEO. The cost estimates created from the MEO are
the costs used in the final Cost Comparison. It is
important to note that the IHCE should not be confused with
the term Independent Government Estimate (IGE), which is an
estimate of the costs and profit to perform the work
described in a PWS that is used in evaluation of contract
offer. The IGE is developed by the contracting office and
used to decide if contract offers are fair and reasonable.
The IHCE is based solely on the information found in the
MEO, therefore, if the MEO is written incorrectly the IHCE
will not be effective.
The TPP and TP are the two different documents written
during the creation of the Government’s Management Plan
that lay out the plan of how the Government will implement
the MEO after the study has been completed. The TPP gives
the details on how the Government will perform the PWS if
the A-76 study results in the selection of the MEO and the
TP outlines the steps the Government will take if the
commercial activity is outsourced.
After the Government’s Management Plan is created, the
process moves into step six which is the Independent
Review. During this step the PWS, QASP, MEO, IHCE, TPP and
TP are all reviewed by the Independent Review Officer
(IRO). The IRO is the agency official responsible for
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certifying that the actions laid out and data contained in
these six documents reasonably establish the Government’s
capability to perform the PWS within the resources made
available by the MEO and to make certain that all costs in
the IHCE are fully defensible. The IRO should be an
individual who has not been a member of the MEO Team and
who possesses the requisite knowledge to accurately judge
the cost effectiveness and efficiency of the new
organization.
After the completion of the Independent Review,
changes can be made to the Government Management Plan up to
the closing date for proposals to be received in response
to the RFP. Any changes made to any of the Government’s
management plan must be certified by the IRO prior to the
receipt of the contract offers. During this step, the IRO
is responsible for ensuring the Government’s management
plan has been written in accordance with the requirements
outline in OMB Circular A-76 and its Supplemental Handbook.
In Step 7, the Government has already received the
contract proposals solicited from industry in Step 4. In
this step the discussion process begins. The Contracting
Officer holds either written or oral discussions with
offerors to resolve any deficiencies in their respective
technical and/or cost proposals. Any discussions held with
the offerors must follow the rules outlined in the FAR.
Each offeror should be given the same amount of time to
make final revisions to their proposals that are then
reevaluated by the technical evaluation panel.
Once industry has made their changes to their
proposals, the Contracting Officer and his team then select
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the single contractor that will compete with the MEO in the
cost comparison. In this selection step, Step 8, the
offeror’s proposals are evaluated differently than they
will be evaluated against the MEO. The selection of the
single contractor will be based on “best value” vice the
“cost comparison” method used in the next step. The
expected outcome of the selection using “best value” is
based on choosing the contractor that provides the greatest
overall benefit to the Government in response to the
solicitation.
In Step 9 the Government then begins the process of
comparing the proposal that was selected in Step 8 with the
Government’s In-house offer. Before any selection or
tentative decision is made, the Source Selection Authority
(SSA) has to first make a determination that the
Government’s technical proposal will provide the same level
of performance as the winning contractor’s offer. If the
Government’s proposal is found deficient in any way, it is
revised and the costs that will be compared in the cost
comparison are recalculated. This evaluation is conducted
to ensure that the two proposals will provide the same
scope of work and level of performance.
Following the leveling process of the Government’s in-
house offer with the contractor’s proposal and final
approval of the two Technical performance plans by the SSA,
the Contracting Officer then opens the Government and
contractor cost proposals and begins the process of
completing the cost comparison. A tentative decision is
then made between the two proposals based on the cost
comparison results.
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It is important to note that the final selection
between the two offers must be based upon lowest cost.
This lowest cost decision is made taking into account a
minimum cost differential requirement. This minimum cost
differential requirement states that in order for the
contractor’s proposal to be selected it must be lower than
the Government’s proposal by the lesser of 10 percent of
the personnel costs in the Government ICHE or $10 million
over the performance period. The purpose of the minimum
cost differential is to avoid the disruption of converting
performance of the commercial activity based on a minimal
cost savings. The Contracting Officer then notifies the
Installation Commander of the tentative decision prior to
making the public announcement of the tentative decision.
Once the public announcement of the tentative decision
is made, Step 10, the Public Review Period, begins. The
Public Review Period normally ends 20 calendar days after
the supporting documentation has been made publicly
available. For particularly complex cost comparisons, the
Contracting Officer can choose to extend this period up to
a maximum of 30 calendar days. During this review period,
administrative challenges to the cost comparison decision
can be made based on asserted errors in the comparison
process. To be considered an eligible appeal the issues
raised have to meet the criteria established in the OMB
Circular A-76 Revised Supplemental Handbook and be
presented in writing to the Contracting Officer prior to
the end of the Public Review Period.
Upon completion of the Public Review Period, one of
two steps is taken (Step 11). If the final cost comparison
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favors an in-house decision, the solicitation is cancelled
and the MEO is implemented in accordance with the
Government Management Plan. Conversely, if the contractor
is awarded the contract, the process of implementing the
Transition Plan outlined in the Government Management Plan
begins.
In either case, when the MEO or the contractor takes
over the existing current in-house operation, a number of
different tasks must be completed. The transition plan is
implemented, which may include a multitude of changes such
as: the turnover of equipment, all personnel requirements,
inventories, procedural changes and other changes that
result from the transition. This transitional period is a
critical time wherein special consideration must be given
to support the personnel in the organization who are
affected by the outcome of the study.
The final step in the A-76 process occurs upon the
full completion of the transitional period. At this point,
the new organization begins full performance of its duties
and the Government implements the QASP. This QASP should
be reviewed periodically. In the case where the Government
MEO is implemented, a formal review and inspection of the
MEO should be conducted somewhere close to the end of the
first full year of performance. The Post-MEO confirms that
the MEO has been implemented in accordance with the
Government management plan. Finally, the conclusion of the
A-76 process is to re-compete the function at the end of
the “contract” performance period.
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D. INTENDED BENEFITS OF THE A-76 PROCESS
Subjecting an activity to the A-76 process is intended
to produce a number of positive benefits that should
ultimately result in creating a stronger overall DoD. A
number of the different likely benefits that result from
the A-76 process include:
a) Introduction of Competition
Although there are a number of different intended
benefits to be achieved by the introduction of the A-76
process, the principal reason to introduce it into an
organization today is to try to draw out new efficiencies
through competition. Dr. Paul Kaminski, former Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology,
explained this core benefit when he stated, “Competition
drives best value, not simply outsourcing for the sake of
outsourcing. If done correctly, outsourcing will not only
save money, it will help DoD to be an organization that
thrives on competition, innovation, responsiveness to
changing needs, efficiency and reliability.” [Ref. 8]
The A-76 process has the ability to introduce
competition into the DoD where the Government normally
operates as a monopolist and is consequently less
efficient. The introduction of competition creates a
number of positive outcomes that include greater
efficiency, better service, more flexibility, better
management focus and increased cost savings.
b) Increased Efficiencies
The A-76 process provides opportunities to increase
efficiency within the organization. When the MEO is being
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created, the Government has to take a serious look at how
they are currently doing business. Their competition is
public industry. If the Government does not take the
competition seriously and does not start to look at more
efficient ways to do business when they are creating the
MEO, the commercial activity may be outsourced.
Conversely, the contractors must find more efficient ways
of performing the commercial activity if they want to be
competitive. “The cost comparison and the competition
itself compel both the Government and industry to become
more efficient”, together they drive the entire
organization to improve. [Ref. 20]
c) Improved Customer Service
The new ideas and efficiencies the Government and the
Contractors develop ultimately are passed onto the
warfighter through improved processes. When a study
results in outsourcing, the Government is able to take
advantage of the opportunity of the efficiencies of the
non-monopolistic market. Since the private sector is
driven by the profit motive, the private sector can
hypothetically be seen as more receptive to customer needs.
“For DoD, competition can lead to more rapid delivery of
better products and services to the warfighter, thereby
increasing readiness”. [Ref. 5]
d) Increased Flexibility
Flexibility is another intended benefit achieved by
the A-76 process. The new organization created as a result
of the A-76 study is re-competed at the end of the contract
performance, which is usually every 3-5 years. This allows
the organization to change if the environment it is
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supporting changes. If the DoD grows or shrinks, the
appropriate size and composition of the resources needed to
complete the tasks associated with the commercial activity
can be adjusted.
e) Better Management Focus
Another benefit garnered through the A-76 process is
the increase in management focus. The size of many
organizations in DoD has continued to grow with the growth
of Government. In many cases, management is put in the
position to spread its attention on areas of their
organization that have nothing to do with the core mission
of the organization. When these pieces of the organization
are outsourced, the organization's leaders are able to
focus more of their valuable attention on the core
competencies of the organization. [Ref. 5]
f) Cost Savings
One of the primary goals of the introduction of
competition in the A-76 process is cost savings. In
general, most studies that have been completed over the
past two decades show this to be the case. One study
conducted by CNA Corporation, which looked at A-76
contracts competed by the DoD between 1978 and 1994, showed
an average savings of 31 percent over the costs incurred
before the A-76 review. [Ref. 9] Similar results were
found in a GAO report, released in 2001, which stated,
“Overall, DOD reported that the A-76 studies generated a
savings of about $290 million in fiscal year 1999 alone”.
[Ref. 25] These savings highlight the future potential of
outsourcing. The bottom line is cost reductions are
achieved whether the competitions are won by the public or
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the private sector. Cost reductions result from the efforts
set forth in the A-76 process, which has set its primary
objective as the ability to achieve more efficient
organizations. [Ref. 24]
As the examples above show, a number of the benefits
that result from applying the A-76 process are a result of
the competition created between the Government and private
industry. These benefits will continue to be achieved
regardless of whether the results of the A-76 study result
in outsourcing or keeping the commercial activity in-house.
E. A-76 PROCESS CONCERNS
While there are several potential benefits related to
the A-76 process, there are also different concerns and
possible drawbacks. Specific concerns with the process
include the following.
a) Perceived Unfair Competition
Competition can be a double-edged sword. Competition
introduces a competitive environment that forces the
government to achieve new efficiencies; however, if private
industry perceives the competition as unfair or too
intensive, it provides a negative incentive to those firms
that might normally compete in an A-76 competition to stay
out of the process. Dennis Wright pointed this out during
a Commercial Activities Panel in June of 2001. He stated,
“Today, the A-76 Commercial Activities program is not seen
as a wise investment.” He goes on to say that the
competition is considered by many industry representatives
as too fierce to make it a wise business decision. This is
because the two-step process first requires competition
between industry and then competition between the industry
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winners with the MEO. The MEO has an unfair advantage of
10 percent or $10 million price differential making the
playing field uneven. The bottom line is the total process
costs an average of $750K for up to three years with an
overall 12 percent probability of winning. Several
companies in the industry do not see a 12 percent chance of
winning as a good business decision. [Ref. 28]
In a May 2001 Contract Management article, Mr. Tim
Whalen, The A-76 Situation: Worse, Not Better, made this
figure of 12 percent look even more dismal when he wrote,
“Today, people bidding A-76 contracts are winning 40
percent of the 25 percent of targets available, for a net
10 percent effective ratio”. [Ref. 27] The concern in
industry appears to be real. Some industry representatives
believe the process is overly biased for the Government and
if the process is not fixed the Government will ultimately
suffer by not having industry’s top companies to compete
with.
b) Overstatement of Projected Savings
In more than one report, GAO has criticized DoD for
their inaccuracies and flaws in their savings estimates
from the A-76 process. In a March 1997 report, the GAO
gave six reasons for the savings that are reported as not
being reliable:
1) Savings estimates often represent projected
rather than realized savings;
2) The costs of the competitions were not
included;
3) Baseline cost estimates were lost over time;
30
4) Actual savings have not been tracked;
5) Where audited, projected savings have not been
achieved; and
6) In some cases, work contracted out was more
expensive than estimated before privatization.
[Ref. 22]
This concern must be addressed. Government officials
go through lengthy budgeting processes and often take into
account the projected savings estimated in these programs
when they design their budgets. If the projected savings
are not achieved, shortfalls in other DoD programs will
occur.
c) Organizational Issues
As was previously pointed out in the intended benefits
area of this thesis, the A-76 process should be able to
provide three benefits: increased flexibility, increased
management focus and improved customer service. Although
these benefits may be achieved after the completion of the
study, during the actual process which, can last anywhere
from 24 to 48 months, the organization can suffer through a
decrease in all three of these areas.
The decrease in these three areas is a result of the
decrease in morale the A-76 process creates. Flexibility
goes away during the process because the study increases
work for everyone in the organization. This ties directly
into the decrease in management focus. Rather than being
able to focus on the organization’s primary mission,
leadership’s focus is forced to deal with the internal
organizational issues that result from the study.
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A number of different personnel issues come to the
surface as a result of the process. People are generally
unhappy and feel very uneasy; the world as they knew it is
being changed by this process. The people being affected
by the study may be forced to retire early, be put in the
position where they have to work for the contractor for
less money, they may have to switch jobs, or even fill a
lower position once the MEO is put into place. Junior
personnel run the chance of losing their jobs completely.
This has the unintended effect of aggravating an aging work
force problem the DoD is dealing with today. (DoD has an
average workforce age that is ever increasing.)
One of the ultimate losers in this process may be the
customer. The process takes a great amount of time and
energy from everyone in the organization. When the focus
of the organization shifts to personnel issues and A-76
study issues, less time and energy can be given to the
customer. This potential pitfall must be addressed prior
to starting the study.
The bottom line that has to be addressed when an A-76
study deals with organizational issues is that
organizations are made up of people. In order for an
organization to succeed, it must take care of those people.
Dr. Randall Yim, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Installations, summed up this area of concern very well
during a conference in February of 2000. He said, “The
most difficult part is that we’re not just talking about
savings, we’re talking about people’s careers.” [Ref. 19]
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d) Destroying Government and Private Industry
Relationships
One of the primary goals of the Defense Review
Initiative (DRI) in 1997 was to improve the relationship
between Government and private industry. The introduction
of the A-76 process has unintentionally created the
opposite effect. The process creates an “Us vs. Them
atmosphere.” During recent Congressional Testimony, the
following statement was made by Dr. Charles Mather, a
Professor from the University of Baltimore Law School,
“Unfortunately, while we were beginning to see more
partnering and cooperative relationships between Government
agencies and their contractors, the push for public-private
competition using the OMB Circular A-76 process has revived
the “us versus them” environment”. [Ref. 10]
This “Us vs. Them” relationship problem stems from
Government employees fearing losing their jobs. The A-76
process, which is often considered as a “win” or “lose”
proposition rather than a “keep in-house” or “contracting
out” process creates two, opposing sides. The contractor
wants the business while the Government employees would
like to keep their jobs. When the contractor calls for
information on how the process is currently being
completed, no one from the Government side wants to talk.
Even if the process is meant to be in the best interest of
the Government, the employees whose positions are being
competed do not have the same understanding. This concern




In this chapter, the researcher provided a detailed
description of the purpose and background of the OMB
Circular A-76 process. The introduction of competition
into Government activities was introduced and discussed
through the thorough description of the 12 Step A-76
process. The chapter ended by discussing both the intended
benefits and unintended concerns that result from the
implementation of the process. By clearly understanding
the entire background of the A-76 process, the reader will
better understand why protests are made to the General
Accounting Office, which is discussed in the next chapter.
The next chapter looks at the protest process and how
the Comptroller General has dealt with A-76 protests.
These protests have increased as a result of increased
number of A-76 studies under the Defense Review Initiative
in 1997. It also provides a list of the remedies available
to the Comptroller General and a breakdown of some of the
common grounds for protests. Finally, it identifies case
principles from both sustained and denied A-76 protests.
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III. A-76 RELATED PROTESTS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter begins with a comprehensive overview of
the GAO Comptroller General bid protest process. It then
reports the total number of GAO bid protests that were
filed with the GAO from January 01, 1997 to December 31,
2001 and then breaks out the total number of A-76 related
GAO protests covering this same period. The A-76 protests
are presented in three separate categories: dismissed,
sustained and denied. The case principles of each category
are identified and presented in their respective
categories. The sustained category includes actual GAO
protests that are representative of the key principles that
are identified. The data presented in this chapter is then
analyzed in depth in Chapter IV.
B. THE GAO BID PROTEST PROCESS
GAO 5 Step Bid Protest Process
Step 1-Interested Party Files Claim
Step 2-Notification of/Response to Protest made by the Contracting Officer
Step 3-Protest is either Dismissed or Identified as a Merit Protest
Step 4-GAO reviews the protest and makes its Decision
Step 5-Agency takes action on the GAO's Decision
Figure 3.1 GAO Five Step Bid Protest Process
The following section presents a detailed explanation
of the GAO bid protest process as it is described in the
General Accounting Office, Administrative Practice and
Procedure, Bid Protest Regulations, Government Contracts 4
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CFR Part 21, effective date August 8, 1996 and the 1999
Government Contract Law Course Text. [Ref. 3 and Ref 21]
The GAO bid protest process is complex and consists of five
distinctive steps (see Figure 3.1).
The first step begins when an interested party files a
written protest with the GAO. The interested party may
submit a protest on various types of solicitations for a
number of different reasons, which include:
1) Protest a contract for the procurement of property or
services;
2) Protest the cancellation of a solicitation;
3) Protest an award or proposed award of a contract; and
4) Protest the termination of a contract, if that
termination was based on improprieties in the award of
the contract.
To be considered timely, the protest must be filed no
later than 10 calendar days after the basis for the protest
is known or should have been known. Where the protest is
challenging a procurement conducted on the basis of a
competitive proposal, which includes a mandate for a
debrief, the protest shall be filed no later than 10
calendar days after the date on which the debriefing is
held.
The written protest must include the following
details:
1) The name, address, and telephone and facsimile number
of the protester;
2) Be signed by the protestor or its representative;
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3) Identify the contracting Agency and the solicitation
and/or contract number;
4) Set forth a detailed statement of the legal and
factual grounds of protest including copies of
relevant documents;
5) Set forth all information establishing the timeliness
of the protest;
6) Specifically request a ruling by the Comptroller
General of the United States; and
7) State the form of relief requested.
Failure to follow any of the guidelines outlined in
this step may result in the dismissal of the protest by the
GAO.
The second step requires the protestor to notify the
Contracting Officer, or the location designated by the
contracting Agency, that a protest has been filed with the
GAO. The protestor must make this notification within one
calendar day of filing the protest. The notification
should include a complete copy of the protest and all
attachments. The GAO is also required to notify the Agency
within one calendar day of receiving the protest.
Once the Contracting Officer receives notification of
a protest, he is required to notify all other interested
parties, including the otherwise successful awardee within
three calendar days. The procurement action should be
automatically suspended when the protest is received.
However, under specific circumstances the Government can
withhold the immediate suspension of the procurement
action. Following the guidelines outlined in The
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Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984, the
contracting Agency can override the suspension of the
procurement action if the performance of the contract is in
the best interest of the Government or if there are
justifiably “urgent and compelling circumstances”. If a
protestor fails to notify the Contracting Officer, the GAO
can dismiss the protest.
The Contracting Officer is then required to file an
Agency report, responding to the protest within 30 calendar
days. A copy of the report must be provided to the
protester. This Agency report should include the
Contracting Officer’s statement of the relevant facts, a
best estimate of the contract value, a memorandum of law,
and a list of all other applicable documents. The
protestor is then given ten calendar days to file a
response to the Agency’s report.
In the third step, the GAO takes one of two actions,
either it dismisses the protest due to procedural error or
substantive defects, or it deems a protest a “merit
protest” at which point it will then go through the GAO
review process. It is important to note that the protest
can be dismissed by the GAO prior to or any time during
step two of this process. The GAO then has 100 calendar
days to review the merit protest and make a decision.
During the review process, the GAO may schedule
informal meetings or conferences to discuss and resolve
procedural matters and to gather additional information
pertaining to the disposition of the protest. Hearings can
also be conducted to decide factual and legal issues raised
during the protest process.
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Upon completion of their review, the GAO makes a
decision. The protest is either denied or sustained. If
the protest is sustained, the Comptroller General can
recommend that the contracting Agency implement any
combination of the following remedies:
1) Terminate the contract;
2) Refrain from exercising options under the contract;
3) Re-compete the contract;
4) Issue a new solicitation;
5) Award a contract consistent with statute and
regulation; or
6) Such other recommendations that GAO determines
necessary to promote compliance.
In all cases, except when the decision contains
protected information, a copy will be provided to the
protestor, the head of the contracting Activity involved,
the senior procurement executive of the Federal Agency
involved, and a copy shall be made available to the general
public. Any decision offered may also include a
recommendation that the Agency reimburse the protesting
contractor for its protest costs, including the costs of
consultants and expert witnesses.
Once a GAO protest decision is passed down, the final
step of the bid process is initiated. The procurement
action is released from suspension, allowing the affected
Federal Agency to accept or reject the GAO’s non-binding
advisory recommendation. Whereas most GAO recommendations
are followed, the GAO does not have the authority to force
its decisions upon agencies of the Executive Branch.
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However, the Federal Agency should be aware that the GAO
reports all instances of non-compliance to Congress in an
annual report.
C. TOTAL GAO AND A-76 PROTEST BREAKOUTS
A comprehensive review and compilation of the protests
reviewed by the GAO from January 01, 1997 to December 31,
2001 was conducted by downloading and individually
reviewing approximately 2100 GAO documents from the GAO
website. (Ref GAO Website) The protests were reviewed and
then assembled into relevant categories to be used for in-
depth analysis.
The total number of bid protests that were filed with
the GAO between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 2001 was
1836. Of the 1836 protests, forty-nine were related to the
A-76 process. GAO dismissed ninety of the 1836 protests
(four A-76 related protest) for failing to meet various
requirements spelled out in the GAO Bid protest process.
During this segregation step, the ninety dismissed protests
were removed from the general group of protests leaving
1750 merit protests. Forty-five of the 1750 merit protests
were A-76 related. The merit protests were then catalogued
by calendar year into sustained or denied categories.
The next step in the grouping process consisted of
separating the A-76 related protest from the rest of the
GAO protests. This breakout pile was used to develop the
detailed analysis in this thesis. After this separation
step was completed, the data was compiled into several
tables. The A-76 data is presented throughout the rest of
this chapter and then analyzed in Chapter IV. A complete
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breakdown of the total protest numbers is presented by year
and category in Table 3.1.
A-76 GAO
Total Protests 49 1836
Merit Protests 45 1750
Sustained Protests 23 307
Denied Protests 22 1443
Dismissed Protests 4 86
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
Merit Protests 456 417 332 274 271 1750
Sustained Protests 68 65 67 55 52 307
Denied Protests 388 352 265 219 219 1443
Dismissed Protests 51 17 5 7 6 86
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
Merit Protests 1 4 10 8 22 45
Sustained Protests 0 0 7 5 11 23
Denied Protests 1 4 3 3 11 22
Dismissed Protests 0 1 0 1 2 4
GAO Bid Protest Statistics (Calendar Year)
A-76 Related Bid Protest Statistics (Calendar Year)
Total A-76 & GAO Bid Protest Statistics
Calendar Year 1999-2001
Table 3.1 Total GAO Bid Protest Statistics 1997-2001
The data compiled in Table 3.1 is used in Chapter IV
to make comparisons between the total GAO protests and A-76
related protests. Comparisons are made between yearly and
five year total sustainment rates, and the trends between
increases/decreases of total protests. The reasons for the
differences between the sustainment rates and trends are
also discussed.
D. DISMISSED A-76 RELATED PROTESTS BREAKOUT
Four of the forty-nine A-76 related protests that were
brought before the GAO were dismissed. As discussed
earlier when describing the GAO Bid Protest Process, a
protest can be dismissed for a number of different reasons.
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The four A-76 related protests that were dismissed fell
into three different categories:
1) Dismissal for failure to be timely;
2) Dismissal for premature filing of the protest; and
3) Dismissal for not meeting the requirements of being an
“interested party”.
The breakout of the dismissed protests is illustrated
in Figure 3.2.












Figure 3.2 Dismissed A-76 Related Protest Breakout
The two premature protest dismissals resulted from the
protestor’s failure to allow the A-76 appeals process to
run its course. In the untimely protest dismissal, the
protestor simply failed to file the protest within the 10-
calendar day rule mandated by the GAO Bid protest process.
The fourth A-76 related protest was dismissed because the
protestors filing the protest were not considered to be
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interested parties eligible to maintain a protest. A more
robust analysis of the four dismissals is presented in
Chapter IV.
E. DENIED A-76 RELATED PROTEST BREAKOUT
As Table 3.1 shows, twenty-two of the forty-five A-76
related merit protests were denied. Unlike the A-76
protests that were dismissed, none of the denied protests
reviewed and listed in Appendix A fit any specifically
identifiable categories. The denied protests were levied
for a variety of different reasons to include:
1) Professed that the Government failed to include a FAR
clause “Indemnification Under Public Law 85-804”;
2) Professed that the Government conducted unequal
technical discussions;
3) Requested that the Government reimburse the costs
incurred in pursuing an administrative appeal;
4) Request for a recommendation that the Government
reimburse the cost of filing an earlier protest
challenging a cost comparison;
5) Protested the proposed action taken by a Government
Agency to correct areas of organizational conflicts of
interest;
6) Protested the Governments alleged failure to meet the
solicitation requirements;
7) Made the accusation that the Government failed to
apply the stated evaluation factors;
8) Argued that the Government’s Cost Comparison failed to
directly compare all positions identified in the MEO;
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9) Protested the Government’s use of in-house auditors as
procedurally improper;
10)Alleged that the Government improperly cancelled the
solicitation and then reinitiated the A-76 Cost
Comparison;
11)Protested the Government’s rejection of a proposal as
technically unacceptable and possible Conflict of
Interest;
12)Protested the ISO 9000 requirement in a solicitation
as being inappropriate selection criteria;
13)Challenged the Government’s final decision after the
Cost Comparison was completed;
14)Protested the evaluation method used by the
Government;
15)Protested that the Government stated proposal was
evaluated against unstated criteria;
16)Argued that the Government failed to seal its
Management Plan/MEO in accordance with A-76 process
guidelines;
17)Protested that the Government failed to use correct
figures in the cost comparison;
18)Protested that the Government improperly evaluated the
proposal and source selection decision were improper;
19)Protested that the Government conducted prejudicially
unequal and misleading discussions with the firm;
20)Protested that the Government evaluation of the
technical proposal was unreasonable;
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21)Protest that the Government improperly “gamed” the
cost comparison; and
22)Protested that the Government’s review procedures were
biased.
Even though all twenty-two protests were denied, there
are still lessons to be learned from them. In a few very
similar cases, the protestors’ positions have been
sustained. The similarities between the denied and
sustained cases and the lessons that can be learned from
the cases are discussed in Chapter IV.
F. SUSTAINED A-76 RELATED PROTEST BREAKOUTS






















Figure 3.3 Sustained Protest Issue Breakout
The GAO sustained the remaining twenty-three A-76
related protests that were determined to be protests with
merit. Figure 3.3 was developed from a review of the
twenty-three sustained protest cases. Unlike the denied
protests, the sustained protests’ case principles fell into
specific identifiable categories. Of the twenty-three
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protests that were sustained: ten dealt with issues related
to conflicts of interest; ten were related to cost
comparison issues; two requested reimbursement of protest
costs; and one was associated with unduly restrictive
competition. The protests that were sustained because of
cost comparison issues broke down further into two
supplementary categories, best-value leveling/in-house cost
estimate problems and improper reversal of initial cost
comparison issues.
In the remaining part of this section, five of the
sustained protests that represent each of the four main
categories and the two cost comparison categories that were
identified above are presented. A case number and date
identify each case and then the protestor’s position is
briefly reviewed. Next, the thought process and principle
the GAO relied upon to sustain the protest is presented.
Finally, in a few of the cases, the Government Agency’s
arguments of their position are briefly reviewed.
1. Unduly Restricts Competition
Matter of BMAR & Associates, INC., B-281664,
March 18, 1999
In this case the protestor’s (BMAR and
Associates, Inc.) principal argument was that the technical
proposals (RFTP) issued by the Government Agency for civil
engineering services at the base waste water treatment
plant operation did not contain sufficient data on which to
base a bid for civil engineer tasks and functions. The
protestor specifically pointed out that the RFTP did not
contain historical data regarding the scope or the
frequency of the service calls that were required by the
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Government Agency in the past for the same type of work or
any detailed estimate of the projected future work.
BMAR went on to argue that the requirement to
submit a lump sum bid on an “ill-defined” RFTP, which
required multiple “non-personal services” including the
provision of personnel, equipment, tools, material,
vehicles, supervision and other items necessary to perform
civil engineering services, ultimately imposed an
unjustifiable amount of risk on them. The GAO sustained
the protest on the principle that:
In sum, since the lump sum pricing scheme may not
result in the lowest possible cost to the
government; subjects the contractor to inordinate
risk; and puts offers at a competitive
disadvantage versus the government in the cost
comparison process, it is unreasonable, and as
such is inconsistent with the statutory
requirement for full and open competition. [Ref.
11]
The Government Agency stated that it released
various documents containing the data needed to create a
competitive proposal; they also stated that they provided
access to a computer terminal that allowed offerors the
opportunity to gather the information on current work
orders needed to complete their proposal. GAO concluded
that the Agency did not adequately justify the inordinate
risks to the contractor arising from the lump-sum pricing
approach resulting in the creation of unduly restrictive
competition.
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2. Request for Reimbursement of Filing and Pursuing
the Protest
Matter of: The Jones/Hill Joint Venture—Costs, B-
286194.3, March 27, 2001
In this case the protestor (Jones/Hill Joint
Venture) made the argument that it should be reimbursed the
costs of filing and pursuing an earlier protest challenging
the Government Agency’s determination to keep services in-
house vice contracting out the activities to the protestor.
(The specific details of the previous protest are not
required to be described in the abridgment of this
protest.) After both sides provided their appropriate
responses to the original protest, the Government Agency
requested that a GAO attorney be assigned to an Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR) conference to assist in coming to
an equitable resolution of the protest issues.
At the conclusion of the ADR, the GAO attorney
informed both parties that in his view the Government
Agency faced significant litigation risk regarding its
determination in the cost comparison. The Agency notified
the GAO that it would take corrective action in response to
the protest. Because the Government Agency made the
assertion that it intended to take the corrective action
outlined in the ADR, the GAO dismissed the protest as
academic. Approximately six months after the original
protest was filed, Jones/Hills filed this protest arguing
that the Navy had unduly delayed taking corrective in
response to what GAO had considered a clearly meritorious
protest. The Comptroller General sustained the protest on
the principle that:
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When a procuring Agency takes corrective action
in response to a protest, our Office may
recommend that the Agency reimburse the protestor
its costs where, based upon the circumstances of
the case, we determine that the Agency unduly
delayed taking corrective action in the face of a
clearly meritorious protest, thereby causing the
protestor to expend unnecessary time and
resources to make further use of the protest
process in order to obtain relief. A protest is
clearly meritorious when a reasonable Agency
inquiry into the protest allegations would show
facts disclosing the absence of defensible legal
position. [Ref. 15]
In its response to this protest, the Government
Agency essentially ignored the ADR conference outcome. It
chose to take piece meal corrective action and argued that
the majority of the protestor’s points made in the first
protest were outside the requirements outlined in the OMB
A-76 Supplemental Handbook; therefore, the protest should
not be considered meritorious. The GAO disagreed with this
line of argument resulting in the sustainment of
Jones/Hill’s protest.
3. Conflict of Interest
Matter of DZS/Baker LLC; Morrison Knudsen
Corporation B-281224, B-2821224.2, B-2821224.3,
B-2821224.4, B-2821224.5, B-2821224.6, January
12, 1999
In this case the protestors (DZS/Baker LLC;
Morrison Knudsen Corporation) argued that the Government
Agency made two grievous errors when making a determination
that the two technical proposals received by the Government
in an A-76 study were found to be severely deficient and
therefore technically unacceptable. This decision by the
evaluation team resulted in a cancellation of the
solicitation and implementation of the MEO. The protestors
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argued that the Agency’s cancellation of the solicitation
was a result of the Government’s failure to conduct
meaningful discussions and unreasonable evaluations of the
technical proposals, which stemmed from the evaluators’
inability to make an impartial evaluation because of
improper conflict of interest. The conflict of interest
position was that fourteen of the sixteen evaluators (four
of the six core evaluators) held positions that were under
study as a part of the A-76 study.
The GAO took the protest under review and
ultimately sustained it using the following line of
reasoning:
While our Office does not review internal Agency
decisions regarding matters not the subject of a
solicitation, where as here, an Agency has
conducted an A-76 competition, thus using the
procurement system to determine whether to
contract out or perform work in-house, we will
consider a protest alleging that the Agency has
not complied with the applicable procedures.
Transactions relating to the expenditure of
public funds require the highest degree of public
trust and an impeccable standard of conduct. The
general rule is to avoid strictly any conflict of
interest or even the appearance of a conflict of
interest in Government-contractor relationships.
We conclude that, in light of this significant
conflict of interest on the part of the
evaluators, the evaluation was invalid and did
not furnish a proper basis for cancellation of
the solicitation. [Ref. 14]
The Government Agency argued that it was aware of the
possible conflict of interest but had no choice because
there were not enough other qualified evaluators available
to sit on the evaluation teams. The Government said they
increased surveillance and physical segregation of the
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evaluators in an attempt to mitigate any possible conflict
of interest. The GAO disagreed with the Government’s
defense stating that the only way they could ever achieve
impartiality in the process would be to completely
reconstitute the evaluation team.
4. Cost Comparison Issue (Best Value Leveling/In-
House Cost Estimate Problems)
Matter of: COBRO Corporation, B-287578.2, October
15, 2001.
In this case the protestor (COBRO Corporation)
contended that the original request for proposal (RFP)
stated that the final proposal to be competed against the
MEO would be the one that provided the overall best value
to the Government. COBRO was picked by the Government to
compete against the MEO. The cost comparison resulted in
the MEO’s cost being under COBRO’s proposal by nearly 50%.
COBRO immediately filed an administrative appeal with the
Government Agency in accordance with the A-76 process
guidelines. The Administrative Appeals board sustained
several of their objections. However, it still ratified
the Government’s decision to go forth with the
implementation of the MEO knowing that a substantial
increase in costs would be required. It based this
decision on the belief that the increase in costs would
still be less than COBRO’s final cost. COBRO then filed an
immediate protest with the GAO citing two major concerns:
1) The RFP improperly required private-sector
offerors to propose their own facilities to physically
store inventory rather than use existing and available
Government facilities as was done under the adjusted MEO,
and that the Agency did not properly account for the
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comparable cost under the MEO in making the cost
comparison; and
2) That by the terms of the RFP and by its conduct of
discussions, the Agency solicited offerors to propose
technical performance enhancements, but did not consider
any evaluated enhancements in COBRO’s proposal. [Ref. 12]
The GAO made its decision to review and then sustain the
protest based on the following principle:
To preserve the integrity of the A-76 cost
comparison, private-sector offerors and the
Government must compete on the same scope of
work. The MEO and the private-sector proposals
must, first, comply with the minimum PWS
requirements, then where a “best-value” approach
is taken in evaluating private-sector proposals,
the Agency must perform a direct comparison
between the non-price aspects of the MEO to the
private-sector proposal to determine whether the
successful private-sector proposal offers quality
and performance exceeding the PWS requirements,
such that the in-house offer must be brought up
to the private-sector proposal’s level of
performance and quality. [Ref. 12]
The Government Agency realized their mistake in not making
the storage facilities available to the contractors in the
RFP. The GAO decision to sustain the protest was made on
the same basis. The Agency’s inclusion of an unjustified
restriction in the RFP prejudiced COBRO and may have had an
uncalculable effect on an even greater field of possible
competition.
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5. Cost Comparison Issue (Reversing of Initial Cost
Comparison)
Matter of: Trajen, Inc., B-284310, B-284310.2,
March 28, 2000
In this case the protestor’s (Trajen, Inc.)
primary concern is with the reasonableness of the
Government Agency’s decision for reversing an initial cost
comparison conclusion. After the Government Agency
selected Trajen’s proposal as the most advantageous
proposal for the purposes of the cost comparison with the
MEO, the two cost comparison worksheets were completed and
compared. Trajen made a proposal with a contract price of
$10,476,263. The Government made an upward adjustment to
the proposal in order to include estimated contract
administration costs, an estimated one-time conversion
costs and a minimum 10% price differential. After the
adjustment was made Trajen’s proposal ended up being
$12,711,615 and the in-house performance was $12,713,463.
Based on these figures Trajen was selected for the award.
In accordance with the administrative appeals
procedures, both the National Association of Government
Employees and Trajen filed appeals challenging the results
of the cost comparison results. The Government appeal
authority adjusted the cost comparisons resulting in the
reversal of the award to Trajen. Trajen subsequently filed
a protest with the GAO. The GAO made its decision to
review and then sustain the protest on the following
principles:
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Where, as here, an Agency has conducted a cost
comparison under OMB Circular A-76, thus using
the procurement system to determine whether to
contract out or to perform work in-house, our
Office will consider a protest alleging that the
Agency has not complied with the applicable
procedures in its selection process or has
conducted an evaluation that is inconsistent with
the solicitation criteria or is otherwise
unreasonable. To succeed in its protest, the
protestor must demonstrate not only that the
Agency failed to follow established procedures,
but also that its failure could have materially
affected the outcome of the comparison. [Ref. 16]
The sustainment decision by the GAO was determined on three
issues that when taken as a whole were considered material.
1) Appeal authority failed to recognize that the
Government did not propose personnel to perform spot
painting.
2) Appeal authority improperly applied non-service
industry classification, which when corrected resulted
in Trajen’s price being lowered for the cost
comparison.
3) Appeal authority used an unreasonable amount when
calculating one-time conversion costs.
When all these factors were taken into account, GAO
recommended Trajen be awarded the contract based on their
total overall contract cost being $86,866 lower than the
government’s projected contract performance costs.
G. SUMMARY
In this Chapter, the researcher presented a complete
review of the GAO protest process and provided a complete
breakdown of all the total GAO Bid protests and A-76
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related protests filed with GAO from January 1, 1997
through December 31, 2001. It also broke out the major
issues related to the dismissed, denied and sustained
categories of the 49 A-76 related protests that cover the
1997-2001 period. The sustained A-76 protests principals
are broken out and presented through a synopsis of five of
the actual cases that were reviewed by GAO. In the next
chapter, Chapter IV, the data presented in this chapter is
used to provide an in-depth trend analysis of the A-76
process based on GAO’s protest decisions.
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This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the data
presented in Chapter III. It makes comparisons and shows
the trends between the 1997-2001 period GAO bid protest
statistics with the 1997-2001 A-76 related protests
statistics. Then, the GAO decisions as they relate to the
A-76 related protest categories (dismissed, denied and
sustained) are each individually analyzed. The sustained
category focuses specifically on the four principle
categories that were presented in Chapter III.
B. COMPARISON OF TOTAL BID PROTEST TO A-76 PROTESTS
A-76 GAO
Total Protests 49 1836
Merit Protests 45 1750
Sustained Protests 23 307
Denied Protests 22 1443
Dismissed Protests 4 86
Sustainment Rate 51.11% 17.54%
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
Merit Protests 456 417 332 274 271 1750
Sustained Protests 68 65 67 55 52 307
Denied Protests 388 352 265 219 219 1443
Dismissed Protests 51 17 5 7 6 86
Sustainment Rate 14.91% 15.59% 20.18% 20.07% 19.19% 17.54%
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total
Merit Protests 1 4 10 8 22 45
Sustained Protests 0 0 7 5 11 23
Denied Protests 1 4 3 3 11 22
Dismissed Protests 0 1 0 1 2 4
Sustainment Rate 0.00% 0.00% 70.00% 62.50% 50.00% 51.11%
Percentage of Total 0.22% 0.96% 3.01% 2.92% 8.12%
GAO Bid Protest Statistics (Calendar Year)
A-76 Related Bid Protest Statistics (Calendar Year)
Total A-76 & GAO Bid Protest Statistics
Calendar Year 1999-2001
Table 4.1 Bid Protest Statistics Totals
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Table 4.1 is very similar to the summary table (Table
3.1) that was presented in Chapter III. The difference is
Table 4.1 includes the sustainment rates for the total GAO
and A-76 related protests, and the percentage rates that
the A-76 related protests make up of the total GAO
protests. Analysis of the data provided in this table
shows that a number of different trends began to rise after
the Secretary of Defense put a renewed emphasis on the A-76
process in 1997. During the five-year period from 1997 to
2001, the total number of merit protests declined. In
1997, contractors made 456 total protests; by 2001, this
number had declined to 271 protests (see Figure 4.1).
During this same period the opposite effect occurred with
the A-76 related protests, in 1997 there was only one A-76
related protest made to the GAO, by 2001 this number












1997 1998 1999 2000 2001














1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
A-76 Merit Protests  
Figure 4.1 Total Protest Trends 1997-2001
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When the total GAO merit protests and A-76 related
merit protests, represented in Figure 5 are put together,
the result is an upward trend in A-76 related protests as a
percentage of total GAO protests. The A-76 related
protests increased from a mere 0.22 percent in 1997 to 8.12
percent in 2001. Figure 4.2 shows a graphic representation
of this trend.
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Figure 4.2 A-76 Protests as a Percentage of Total Protests
As is pointed out in the introduction of this thesis,
the DRI of 1997 called for 120,000 civilian positions to be
reviewed using the OMB Circular A-76 process from 1998
through 2002. This mandate of reviews written into the DRI
resulted in an increase of more than three times the number
of positions being reviewed over a five-year period than
were reviewed over the previous twenty-five years. It is
logical to draw the conclusion that if there was an
increase in studies conducted over this period that an
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increase in protest would occur. However, given the scope
of the thesis and the data collected, it is difficult to
take this assumption any further.
Another conclusion that is drawn, using similar logic,
is that since the Secretary of Defense mandated the
increase in studies, the Service Secretaries also put an
increased emphasis on more of their respective activities
to apply the A-76 process. If the A-76 process previously
had not been used at many of these activities, it is
probable that there would be more of a chance for mistakes
to occur when applying the process. Since the A-76 process
can take up to three years, it is also probable that the
total number of protests would begin to increase in 1999,
which Figure 4.2 reveals. A trend to look for in the
future is a decrease in A-76 related protests starting
somewhere around 2003 as the learning curve of the A-76
process begin to kick in. The analysis of the sustained
protests that is presented later in this chapter points out
four specific areas of the A-76 process that Government
Activities seem to be having difficulty with.
Table 4.1 also includes the sustainment rates for both
the Total GAO Merit Protests and the A-76 Related protests.
This data is depicted graphically in Figure 4.3. The
number of total GAO merit protests that were sustained
between 1997 and 2001 fluctuated between fourteen and
twenty percent, whereas the number of sustained A-76
related protests fluctuated between zero and seventy
percent between the same time period. The average
sustainment rate percentage over the five-year period for
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total GAO merit protests was 17.5 percent and 51.1 percent
for A-76 related protests.
Figure 4.3 Protest Sustainment Rate Comparison
One conclusion that can be drawn from looking at the
difference between the two average sustainment rates over
the five-year period is the familiarity or lack of
familiarity the acquisition force has with the A-76
process. GAO reviews a number of different acquisition
issues that land on their docket every year. The average
sustainment rate for total protests, 17.5 percent, shows
that for the majority of the issues, the acquisition force
is applying the rules and processes correctly. Conversely,
a 51.1 percent sustainment rate for the A-76 related
protests leads to the conclusion that the acquisition
force, and the other personnel involved in applying the A-
76 process, are still figuring out how the process works.
The A-76 process is challenging the workforce. The
specific areas of the A-76 process that are the most
challenging a regular basis are discussed in the next three
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C. ANALYSIS OF DISMISSED A-76 RELATED PROTESTS
The Researcher believes there are lessons that can be
learned by looking at the four A-76 related protests that
were dismissed between 1997 and 2001. The first lesson is
GAO seems to be making the point that it will support the
A-76 process and the acquisition process, as they exist in
their respective current designs. Two of the four A-76
related protests that were dismissed were dismissed for
being premature. In one case, the protestor filed the
protest prior to being debriefed by the Contracting Officer
after not being selected as the proposal for comparison
with the MEO, GAO dismissed it as premature telling the
contractor to follow the rules. The second protest was
dismissed as premature because the protestor, after having
its appeal upheld by the appeals authority in the A-76
process, failed to allow the agency to take any corrective
action. In both cases, the GAO sent the signal that the
protestors need to allow the system or process to work as
it is designed.
Another lesson is that if a contractor does not follow
the guidelines outlined in the GAO Bid protest process,
their complaint may never be heard. In the A-76 related
case discussed in Chapter 3, the protestor filed its
complaint after the 10-day calendar window required by the
GAO Bid Protest Guidelines. Even though the protest was
filed late, the GAO considered it under the “significant
issue” or “good Cause” exception. To meet this requirement
the protest must “raise issues that have not been
considered on the merits in a prior decision and that are a
widespread interest to the procurement community”. [Ref.
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13] If the GAO did not follow their guidelines, they would
run a chance of receiving protests years after the basis
for the alleged protest occurred, making it very difficult
to ever review a case properly.
A final lesson learned from the dismissed A-76 related
protests is that the protestor must fit the definition of
an interested party in order for their protest to be heard
by the GAO. In the case described in Chapter 3, the
federal employees and the unions representing them were not
considered interested parties by the GAO’s definition,
which requires the parties to be actual or prospective
bidders. The GAO did not say they would not look at a case
if it involved procedural application problems of the A-76
process. It said that it would not look at a protest
presented by the federal unions that asserts that the
federal employees or their union will be adversely affected
by an Agency’s decision to contract out vice keep it in
house. If the GAO reviewed cases based on the employees
being adversely affected by the A-76 process, it is very
possible that every A-76 study would be protested. The
bottom line is that GAO will review A-76 process
applications problems but not protests that could have a
negative affect on the employees’ lives.
D. ANALYSIS OF DENIED A-76 RELATED PROTESTS
Although the twenty-two merit protests in this
category were denied, the Government should take one
general lesson from this group of protests. The old adage
that “perception is reality” needs to be taken to heart.
The fact that the contractor took the time to file a
protest means that they believe (or perceive) that
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something went wrong in the application of the A-76
process. Some argue that it only takes a 34-cent stamp to
make a protest, but the reality is that when a company
files a protest they have to spend a lot of money defending
their position. The protestors genuinely believe they have
been treated unfairly and use the GAO Bid protest process
as an avenue to seek recourse. The main point here is that
although the twenty-two protests were denied, the parties
that levied the protests have the perception that somewhere
in the process something was not done right.
E. ANALYSIS OF SUSTAINED A-76 RELATED PROTESTS
This area of the thesis should be given a serious
amount of attention. When the GAO sustains a protest, they
are saying that the Government has made a mistake. In
Chapter 3, four general categories emerged as areas that
the GAO has been finding in favor of the protestors in A-76
related cases. The four categories include the area of
Conflict of Interest, Unduly Restrictive Competition,
Requests for reimbursement of protest costs and various
problems in the area of creating the Cost Comparison.
Before the four areas of concern are individually
analyzed, the data from the protests that were denied, when
there is a proper fit, are combined with the four
categories of the sustained protests that were looked at.
When the data is combined, interesting trends emerge (See
Figure 4.4)
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Figure 4.4 Sustained Protests Broken Out By Category
The key point to take from Figure 4.4 is that between
1997 and 2001, when an A-76 related protest was levied in
any of the four major categories identified in the chart,
there was a 50 to 71 percent chance that the protest would
be upheld. This high range in percentages highlights the
importance of the GAO decisions relating to these issues.
These four categories covered thirty-three of the forty-
five A-76 related merit protests review by the GAO from
1997 to 2001. The reasons why the protests had such a high
percentage chance of being upheld are discussed by category
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1. Conflict of Interest
In the area of Conflict of Interest, the GAO sustained
ten of fourteen protests in this category. The lesson
learned here is that the Government Agency must take the
necessary steps to ensure all the evaluations in the
process are conducted with impartiality. The general rule
should be to rigorously avoid any conflict of interest or
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even the appearance of a conflict of interest in
Government-contractor relationships at all times.
When the A-76 and Contracting Teams are being formed
in the second step of the A-76 process, the Contracting
Officer must step back and look at the teams that are being
created. He must take the view of an impartial outsider.
In the protest that was discussed in Chapter III regarding
the category of conflict of interest, the Contracting
Officer should have used a “perception” check. He should
have asked himself what an outsider might think. A
particular lesson that should always be kept in mind is
that if it looks bad i.e., picking 14 of the 16 evaluators
from the activity that is under study, it will more than
likely look bad to the GAO.
In this case, the Contracting Officer made the
statement that he did not have enough qualified people
within his command to sit on the evaluation team other than
those that were chosen from the activity under study. This
being the case, he should have continued to look for other
options when designing the team. He could have trained
other personnel or picked evaluators from outside his
command. The argument he could make to counter the options
is that taking these steps would be difficult and time
consuming. He needs to realize in the end, the amount of
time and effort put into defending a protest may ultimately
be more than the extra time and effort that is put in the
front end of the A-76 process.
One other area the Contracting Officer must be
cautious of is a possible conflict of interest becoming an
issue when assigning the personnel to write the PWS and the
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In House Cost Estimate. According to the GAO’s decision in
Matter of: The Jones/Hill Joint Venture, the GAO decided
that these two people should be different. The GAO
references FAR Subpart 9.5 in making its opinion that this
is considered a conflict of interest. This part of the FAR
discusses the agency’s obligation to reasonably avoid
“unequal access to information” and “biased ground rules”.
[Ref. 6] The GAO makes the point that, “it is difficult to
see how there can be a level playing field between public
and private offerors” where one competitor, in this case
the MEO team, receives a competitive advantage by having
written and edited the PWS.
One of the points made in Chapter 2 regarding some of
the limitations of the A-76 process, indirectly refers to
one of the unintended consequences that occur because of
continual perceived conflicts of interest. If the private
sector begins to see the A-76 process as a bad business
decision as a result of unfair competition i.e., conflicts
of interest that favor the Government agency, the private
sector companies will start to quit competing in the A-76
competitions. The GAO has shown the Government that it
will sustain the majority (71 percent) of the protests
where conflict of interest is an issue.
2. Unduly Restricts Competition
A second categorical trend that has emerged in the
review of the A-76 related protests is the area of unduly
restrictive competition. This category finds its roots in
basic human nature. Chapter II of the thesis brought up
the issue of resistance from the workforce when conducting
A-76 studies. This resistance makes sense; the A-76
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process requires the Government employees to assist the
contractors when making their proposals. When the
employees are being asked to do this, they often do not
want to willingly give information to the contractors.
Doing so could ultimately result in losing their job or
working for a contractor for less money. This essentially
creates an “Us vs. Them” relationship between the
Government Agency and Contractors competing in the process.
It is the Contracting Officer’s job to remain
impartial when dealing with this phenomenon. If the
Contracting Officer lets himself lose his impartiality, he
may inadvertently begin to create a situation that could
ultimately result in unduly restrictive competition. This
occurred in the BMAR Associates protest that was outlined
in Chapter III. The GAO found that the Government Agency
had written a RFTP that required the offeror to submit a
lump sum bid without having the necessary information to
create a competitive bid. This is the type of situation
that the Contracting Officer is responsible for keeping
from happening.
3. Reimbursement of Protest Costs
A third trend that has surfaced is after the
protestors initially protest an action, the protest is
denied or dismissed and then the protestor comes back later
and asks to be reimbursed for the protest costs. In most
cases, once the GAO has dismissed or denied a protest, it
will not recommend that the protestor be paid for their
protest costs.
In the request for reimbursement case that was
discussed in Chapter III, the GAO sustained the protestor’s
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second protest for costs after it had already dismissed the
protestor’s initial protest. In this case, the GAO seemed
to be sending a signal to the Government Agency. Although
the protest had been dismissed, an ADR conference that was
chaired by a GAO attorney, which basically found the
protestor’s case to be meritorious, was ignored by the
Government. When the Government Agency failed to take any
corrective action after the ADR, the protestor resubmitted
its protest for reimbursement of costs. The GAO upheld its
request. The GAO sent a message to the Government Agency
that it should not play games with the protestors by using
the GAO Bid protest process.
4. Cost Comparison Issues
The category of Cost Comparison Issues is for the most
part the most challenging of the four categories Government
Agencies are dealing with today. Like the Conflict of
Interest category, the GAO upheld 71 percent of all A-76
related protests made in this category. However, unlike
the Conflict of Interest category, the Cost Comparison
issues seem to be more difficult to solve. Interpretation
is a key factor in this area. The analysis of this
category has been subdivided into two main areas of
concern, problems with Best Value leveling and accurate In-
house Cost estimates, and Reversal of initial decisions.
a. Best Value Leveling and Accurate In-house Cost
Estimates
The challenge that Contracting Officer’s are
dealing with in this area revolves around first picking a
proposal that is based on best value and, when necessary,
trying to find a way to fairly level the Government’s
proposal in order to ensure the final cost comparison is
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being made on level playing field. “To preserve the
integrity of the A-76 cost comparison process the private-
sector offerors and the Government must compete on the
basis of the same scope of work.” [Ref. 12] The protests
that are being levied at the GAO are showing that the
Government is having a very difficult time doing this.
The difficulty stems from having to shift the
entire thought process after the best value decision has
been made. The winner of the final cost comparison is made
on best value. Combining Best Value and low cost is
difficult. Before the Cost Comparison occurs the MEO has
to be reviewed and compared to the winning proposal from
the private sector by the SSA. If the performance of the
MEO and the private sector proposal do not match, leveling
has to occur. The MEO has to revise its technical proposal
and cost estimate before the agency conducts the final cost
comparison. The problem is that when leveling occurs
between the MEO and the private sector proposal, technical
data cannot be passed to the MEO team. If this happens,
the private sector proposal becomes free consultation for
the Government Agency. The long-term effect is the
contractor loses any incentive to propose innovative ideas
or a higher level of performance in future competitions.
The numbers of different leveling issues that can
occur in a proposal are endless. In the case that was
discussed in Chapter III, the Government failed to remove
the cost of storage facilities that they erroneously left
out of the PWS. This had a drastic impact when the cost
comparison was completed. Ultimately GAO sided in favor of
the protestor. The problem is that the Government should
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be picking up these types of issues in the review and
leveling process, the scope of the work needs to match in
order to maintain the integrity of the A-76 process.
b. Reversal of Initial Cost Comparison
This area was broken out from the Best-Value
category because it deals with the area of perception. In
a few cases, the GAO sustained protests based on the
Government reversal of the initial cost comparison
decision. The GAO decision did not decide in favor of the
protestor merely because the Government changed its mind.
The GAO went through the process of checking all the
numbers, recalculating and then sustaining the protests.
The problem here is that the Government made, on more than
one occasion, a mistake by reversing their decision.
As discussed in Chapter II, many businesses are
no longer competing in the A-76 arena because they see it
as a bad business decision. The studies where the cost
comparison decisions are changed exasperate this problem.
Why would a company want to compete when after it had been
told, after a three-year process, that it won the
competition that decision was later overturned? The more
times this phenomena occurs, the fewer companies will want
to compete.
The bottom line in this area is that the
Government needs to be careful when they are making their
decisions. Although they may not be intending to send the
signal that they are “Gaming the System” to keep an




In this chapter, the researcher documented a trend
analysis of GAO protest decisions. The trend analysis
indicates that the number of A-76 related protests
increased as the requirement to compete more Government
Activities with the private sector increased. It then
examined the three categories of A-76 protests and the
lessons learned from each of them. It concluded by
highlighting four major issues that have begun to emerge as
the number of A-76 related protests has increased. Those
common issues highlighted in the final section are the
issues that procurement professionals need to look at when
conducting an A-76 study.
The next chapter will provide conclusions,
recommendations and answers to the primary and secondary
research questions. It will also include suggested areas
of further research.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of this thesis was to determine if
the A-76 related protests that were made to the GAO from
January 1, 1997 through December 31, 2001 were uncovering
any major trends related to the A-76 process. The goal was
to identify the trends, and if the trends were found to be
deficiencies, to make recommendations on how the
acquisition force could properly address the issues.
This chapter presents the researcher’s conclusions and
makes recommendations of possible pitfalls that the
acquisition community should consider when applying the A-
76 process today. The conclusions are presented by
reviewing the primary and secondary research questions.
The chapter concludes with the researcher’s recommended
areas for further study and analysis.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. What are the key case principles and trends
involving the A-76 Process brought before the
General Accounting Office (GAO), and how might this
information be used to improve the Department of
Defense’s Acquisition Process?
The analysis of the total protests and the specific A-
76 related protests that were reviewed by the GAO from 1997
through 2001 resulted in two major trends and four major
case principles. These are issues that acquisition
professionals should keep track of and take necessary
action to prevent when conducting an A-76 study.
The first key trend that surfaced was the overall
change in the number of A-76 related protests that were
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being reviewed by the GAO. Although the total number of
GAO merit protests decreased over the five-year period, the
total number of A-76 related protests was on the rise. The
researcher believes that the increase in A-76 related
protests is primarily the result of the increased number of
studies that the 1997 DRI mandated. The increase in A-76
related studies increased the number of activities using
the A-76 process, which in turn resulted in a learning
curve effect. The researcher believes the total number of
A-76 related protests will begin to decrease as the
activities begin to apply the process more effectively.
The second major trend that emerged in the analysis
was the difference in sustainment rates between the total
GAO Merit protests and the A-76 related protests. Over the
five-year period that was reviewed, A-76 related protests
had an average sustainment rate of 51.1 percent, whereas
the Total GAO protests had an average sustainment of 17.5
percent. The researcher believes this is a result of the
overall lack of familiarity the Acquisition force has with
the A-76 process. As Chapter 2 points out, the A-76
process has gone through several changes over its 35-year
history. In addition, up until the push for A-76 studies
was mandated in 1997, the use of the A-76 process by
activities was not a regular occurrence. Because the
activities applying the process were not using it
regularly, they were prone to make mistakes. With time, as
the activities review the lessons learned and key
principles for the sustainment of the GAO protests, this
sustainment rate will decrease.
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The four major case principles that resulted from the
review of the A-76 related protests came from the protests
that were sustained by the GAO. The first principle that
emerged from the research dealt with the area of conflict
of interest. Thirty one percent of the A-76 related
protests that were seen by the GAO dealt with the area of
Conflict of interest, 71 percent of these protests were
upheld. The conclusion here is that Government Agencies
need to pay special attention to the areas of the A-76
process that may result in possible conflicts of interest.
Specifically the Contracting Officer needs to be careful
when selecting the personnel who will sit on the evaluation
teams and who will write the PWS and the IHCE.
The second major principle that was identified in the
A-76 related protest results was the creation of unduly
restrictive competition. This occurs when the Government
Agency fails to write a PWS that the contractor can
decipher well enough to compete on. The other issue that
is tied to the unduly restrictive competition is the
support the employees give the contractor when it is trying
to develop its proposal. Although it is a competition, the
employees are still required to give some basic information
in order for the contractor to develop a competitive
proposal.
The third major case principle that surfaced related
to the GAO supporting the contractor’s protest to be
reimbursed for protests costs after it had its original
protest dismissed. The lesson here was that the Government
should not play games with the protestors. If the GAO
takes the time to complete an ADR, and then dismisses their
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protest on the premise of the ADR, the Government should
take the corrective action recommended. Otherwise, the GAO
will make the Government pay the protest costs.
The final major case principle that materialized in
the research dealt specifically with the cost comparison
step of the A-76 process. Thirty one percent of the A-76
related protests made from 1997-2001 were related to the
cost comparison decision and 71 percent of these protests
were upheld. The researcher believes that this is the step
in the A-76 process that needs special attention. It is
imperative that the SSA ensures that the MEO has been
properly aligned to meet the same performance standards as
the competing offer, prior to completing the cost
comparison. Otherwise, the result will be comparing two
proposals that do not meet the same scope of work.
The other issue that emerged as a result of cost
comparison problems was the reversal of proposals after the
final decision had been made. The questions that surfaces
are, what was the reversal of the initial decision based on
and was the initial cost comparison completed incorrectly
or was the initial decision bad? In order to stop further
decisions from being reversed, there needs to be a
balancing of the review process that helps to ensure the
integrity of the system while maintaining the need for
efficiency in the system. It is the researcher’s opinion
that if the process is not fixed and a balance is not
achieved, reversals will continue to occur, which will
ultimately result in the private sector competing in the A-
76 competitions.
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These four case principles are key areas that the
acquisition force should primarily focus on when conducting
an A-76 study, if they intend to keep their A-76 studies
from being protested.
2. What is the history and background of the A-76
process?
Chapter II of this thesis gives a full description of
the history and background of the A-76 process dating back
to its origins in the 1955 Eisenhower Administration. The
conclusion that should be drawn from the background
description is that although the process was slow to start
in the Mid 1960s, in 1997 the A-76 process was reborn as
the efficiency tool of choice for use throughout the
Federal Government. It was planted in the DRI in 1997 and
then given teeth through the FAIR Act in 1999. Over the
life of the process, it has gone through several facelifts
ultimately emerging as a complex efficiency tool that is
used regularly by the acquisition community today.
3. How has the A-76 process been applied throughout
the DoD?
Based on the GAO protest trends that were depicted in
Chapter III and IV, when the A-76 process is compared to
other acquisition processes, there is a steep learning
curve effect. This conclusion is based on comparing the
average sustainment rate for all GAO merit protests, which
was 17.5 percent, to the A-76 related protests average
sustainment rate, which was 51.1 percent from 1997-2001.
The researcher believes that acquisition professionals are
still learning how the A-76 process works. As pointed out
earlier, over time this sustainment rate should begin to
decrease as the familiarity with the process increases.
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4. What problems, if any, have resulted from DoD’s
application of the A-76 process?
The problems that resulted from the application of the
process were outlined in the first question answered in
this section. To summarize, the three primary problems
that have emerged in the application of the A-76 process
include:
a. Problems Associated with Conflicts of Interest;
b. Issues involving Unduly Restrictive Competition; and
c. Problems Involving the Cost Comparison step of the
A-76 process.
These three major application issues surfaced in the
thesis research. Acquisition professionals need to take
special note of the issues and look for ways to keep them
from occurring in the future.
5. What benefits, if any, has DoD realized because
of the A-76 process?
Although the research completed for this thesis did
not specifically result in any specific identifiable or
quantifiable benefits that are being realized by the A-76
process, the researcher believes that in theory the
application of the A-76 process itself, if done correctly,
is an enormous benefit. The A-76 process is designed to
create efficiencies through the introduction of competition
in organizations that are normally void of competition.
The efficiencies occur when the Government Agency creates
the MEO to compete with the private sector’s best value
proposal. Regardless of who wins the cost comparison,




DOD Acquisition professionals should be made aware of
the key case principles that were identified in this
thesis’ Conclusion Section. By understanding the key case
principles, they will be able to take steps to avoid
possible problem areas in the A-76 process that are most
likely to draw a protest. Based on the analysis of the key
case principles identified and discussed in Chapter III and
IV, DoD acquisition professionals should:
a. Avoid possible conflicts of interest issues by
having the Contracting Officer pay special
attention when developing the evaluation teams; if
necessary go to other commands to fill the team;
b. Inform the team that it is their responsibility to
remain impartial. Reiterate the point that the A-
76 process is not a win/lose competition it is a
competition that is set up to chose the best option
to support the Government.
c. Make sure that the person(s) assigned to write the
MEO is not the same person(s) assigned to write the
In-house cost estimate.
d. Communicate with employees whose jobs are under
study, explain that although it may not seem like
it is in their best interest if they do not support
the A-76 process, there is a good chance the
process will end up at the GAO.
e. When an ADR is finished, and both parties have
agreed to certain actions, make sure the actions
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are followed through. Failure to do so can result
in subsequent protests.
f. Pay special attention when creating the PWS, this
document is the key document in the A-76 process.
g. Ensure that the MEO has been leveled fairly and
that it meets the same performance requirements the
private sector proposal is achieving in order to
result in an “apples to apples” vice “apples to
oranges” comparison.
h. Ensure that the final cost comparison has been
completed correctly prior to releasing the final
decision. Wherever possible try not to put the
Government in the position of having to reverse its
initial decision.
D. SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
During this study, the researcher found the following
areas that warrant further research:
a. In 2006, conduct follow-on analysis of the
protests brought before the GAO from 2002 through
2006 to determine if there was an actual learning
curve associated with the A-76 process. Include
in this analysis a review of the four key case
principles identified in this thesis.
b. Conduct an analysis that looks at the actual
number of studies completed by the DOD from
January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2001. Do a trend
analysis using the data collected in this study to
see if there is an increase or decrease in the
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total number of protests being levied on an annual
basis.
c. Conduct an analysis that reviews the actual cost
savings that DOD claims to be achieving as a part
of the A-76 process. Include in the analysis both
short term and long term cost analysis.
81
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
82
APPENDIX A
A-76 RELATED GAO BID PROTESTS 1997-2001
Protest # Date Protest # Date
Dismissed Sustained
1 B-281082 12/22/1998 1 B-281224 1/12/1999
2 B-282904.2 6/7/2000 2 B-281224.2 1/12/1999
3 B-288507 9/7/2001 3 B-281224.3 1/12/1999
4 B-287070 1/31/2001 4 B-281224.4 1/12/1999
Denied 5 B-281224.5 1/12/1999
1 B-277614 11/3/1997 6 B-281224.6 1/12/1999
2 B-278187 1/5/1998 7 B-281664 3/18/1999
3 B-280431 9/29/1998 8 B-283727.2 2/22/2000
4 B-280988 12/17/1998 9 B-284310 3/28/2000
5 B-280988.2 12/17/1998 10 B-284310.2 3/28/2000
6 B-281323 1/25/1999 11 B-284997 6/29/2000
7 B-281199.2 3/4/1999 12 B-283817.3 12/19/2000
8 B-283055 9/23/1999 13 B-286714.2 2/13/2001
9 B-285841 10/17/2000 14 B-286194.3 3/27/2001
10 B-286271 12/1/2000 15 B-287189 5/14/2001
11 B-286194.2 12/8/2000 16 B-287189.2 5/14/2001
12 B-287121 3/30/2001 17 B-284833.3 7/17/2001
13 B-287270 4/12/2001 18 B-284833.4 7/17/2001
14 B-284997.2 5/18/2001 19 B-283727.3 8/22/2001
15 B-285938.6 7/13/2001 20 B-287578.2 10/15/2001
16 B-286714.3 8/20/2001 21 B-286194.4 12/5/2001
17 B-288392 10/23/2001 22 B-286194.5 12/5/2001
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